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What is the impact of surprise and anticipated policy changes when agents form expectations
using adaptive learning rather than rational expectations? We examine this issue using
the standard stochastic real business cycle model with lump-sum taxes. Agents combine
knowledge about future policy with econometric forecasts of future wages and interest rates.
Dynamics under learning can have large impact effects and a gradual hump-shaped response,
and tend to be prominently characterized by oscillations not present under rational expecta-
tions. These fluctuations reflect periods of excessive optimism or pessimism, followed by
subsequent corrections.
& 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Typically economic models are analyzed with an unchanged structure. In practice, policy changes take place, and these
often involve long delays. In the case of fiscal policy these lags sometimes exceed two years. The process of changing taxes
involves legislative lags, between when the new tax is proposed and when it is passed, and implementation lags, between
when the legislation is signed into law and when it actually takes effect. These changes in policy may well be anticipated by
economic actors and will influence decisions even before the actual implementation of the proposed policy change.1
The standard assumption in macroeconomics is, of course, rational expectations (RE), and this has been used to analyze
the impact of both surprise and preannounced policy changes. Within a nonstochastic perfect foresight setting, see
for example, Sargent and Wallace (1973), Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Romer (2011) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012).
The seminal contributions of Baxter and King (1993) and Aiyagari et al. (1992) analyze changes to fiscal policy within a RE
framework in the stochastic real business cycle (RBC) model.2
However, the benchmark assumption of RE is very strong and arguably unrealistic when analyzing the effect of policy
changes. Agents need to have complete knowledge of the underlying structure, both before and after the policy change.All rights reserved.
ax: +44 1334 462444.
k, km91@st-andrews.ac.uk (K. Mitra).
rious countries around the world (like in the US and UK) in the wake of the recent “Great Recession”.
dits and large public works projects; see for instance Auerbach et al. (2010).
e effects of anticipated changes in policy. We comment on this literature in Section 5.
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that other agents are equally knowledgeable and equally rational.
Recently there has been increasing interest in studying situations in which agents have incomplete knowledge of the
economy. The assumption that economic agents engage in “learning” behavior has been incorporated into macroeconomic
theory (see e.g. Sargent, 1993 and Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) and used in a wide range of applications in macroeconomics
and finance. The standard adaptive learning approach treats economic agents like econometricians who estimate forecast
rules, updating the parameter estimates over time as new data become available. It has been shown that in many models,
including the RBC model, least-squares learning can converge over time to the RE solution, while at the same time often
providing plausible transitional dynamics that are arguably of empirical importance.3
However, analyses of learning typically assume an unchanged economic structure.4 An apparent drawback of least-
squares learning rules is that estimated coefficients respond relatively slowly to data, and thus standard learning rules take
time to adjust to structural or policy changes. In some cases this is realistic, but in the case of clearly articulated policy
changes one would expect even boundedly rational agents to incorporate structural information about future policy.
In this paper we show how to analyze fiscal policy changes in a learning framework for the stochastic RBC model. To do
so we assume that agents forecast some key variables using adaptive learning, while simultaneously incorporating struc-
tural knowledge about future government spending and taxes. For reasons of space we focus on permanent policy changes,
and the results are contrasted with those from the RE approach.5 One case we consider in detail is the impact of announced
future policy changes.
The question of how to analyze known structural changes in a learning framework was taken up in Evans et al. (2009).
They considered announced changes in fiscal policy in a simple endowment economy model and (briefly) in a Ramsey
model. However, a major limitation of their framework was its deterministic nature which consequently restricted the type
of learning behavior that could be analyzed.6 In addition, the variable labor supply assumption in the RBC model plays a
crucial role in the policy analysis of government spending by Baxter and King (1993).
Our approach uses an adaptive learning model in which agents in effect also have partial structural knowledge. At each
moment in time agents must make consumption and labor supply decisions based on the time path of expected future
wages, interest rates and taxes. As is standard with adaptive learning, we assume that agents make forecasts of wages and
interest rates based on a statistical model, with coefficients updated over time using least-squares. However, for forecasting
future taxes we assume that agents use the path of future taxes announced (credibly) by policymakers.7
This approach seems to us very natural. The essence of the adaptive learning approach is that agents are assumed not
to understand the general equilibrium considerations that govern the evolution of the central endogenous variables, i.e.
capital, labor and factor prices. Agents are therefore assumed to forecast these variables statistically. On the other hand,
agents can be expected to immediately incorporate their decisions about the direct effects on their future net incomes of the
announced path of future taxes. As noted in Evans et al. (2009), this general approach to combining statistical learning and
limited structural knowledge can be adapted to other economic situations.
Several general features stand out in our analysis of fiscal policy changes in the RBC model. As under RE, announced
current or future changes in government spending leads to immediate changes in consumption, employment, and output.8
However, with adaptive learning the solution exhibits hump-shaped responses and oscillatory convergence to the new
steady state, including overshooting not present under RE. These dynamics stem from a combination of inertia in capital
accumulation and the adaptation of expectations to data generated by the learning rules used by private agents.
We also show that impact effects of policy changes, announced to take place in the future, can be more extreme under
learning than under RE, because the wealth effects of future tax changes are immediate, while partly offsetting price effects
are spread out over time and unknown to agents.
A final important feature of the model under learning dynamics is that policy changes can lead to systematic waves of
optimism or pessimism. The details depend naturally on the type of policy change considered. For example, a permanent
increase in government spending, announced to take place in the future, generates a period of over-optimism concerning
wages during much of the pre-implementation period, followed by a correction during the post-implementation period.
Such periods of over-optimism or over-pessimism reflect general equilibrium effects, and are a consequence of the agents's
incomplete structural knowledge.
Section 2 below describes the basic RBC model in the presence of learning by agents. Section 3 analyzes permanent
changes in policy both within a RE framework and under learning. Section 4 looks at the robustness of our results, including
alternative assumptions about agents beliefs. Section 5 relates our approach to the recent literature on fiscal and news
shocks. The final section concludes.3 See Sargent (2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2013) for extensive references.
4 See, however, Evans et al. (2001), Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Giannitsarou (2006) for partial exceptions.
5 Temporary policy changes are considered in the working paper version of this paper (Mitra et al., 2011), and their policy implications are examined in
Mitra et al. (2012).
6 For a discussion of the differences of learning in deterministic and stochastic models, see Evans and Honkapohja (1998).
7 For convenience we assume a balanced budget, so that in each period taxes equal government spending.
8 Surprisingly, it appears that announced future changes of government spending have not previously been systematically studied under RE for the
stochastic RBC model.
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There is a representative household who has preferences over non-negative streams of a single consumption good ct and
leisure 1−nt given by
E^ t ∑
∞
s ¼ t
βs−tUðcs;1−nsÞ
 
: ð1Þ
Here E^ t denotes potentially subjective expectations at time t for the future, which agents hold in the absence of rational
expectations. The analysis of the model under RE is standard. When RE is assumed we indicate this by writing Et for E^ t . Our
presentation of the model is general in the sense that it applies under learning as well as under RE.
We assume the general form
Uðcs;1−nsÞ ¼
c1−ss
1−s
þ ζ ð1−nsÞ
1−ϵ
1−ϵ
; ð2Þ
for s; ϵ; ζ40, and often focus on the widely considered special case, s¼ ϵ¼ 1, i.e. Uðcs;1−nsÞ ¼ ln cs þ ζ lnð1−nsÞ as in
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, p. 376), Long and Plosser (1983) and McCallum (1989).9
The household flow budget constraint is
atþ1 ¼wtnt þ rtat−ct−τh;t where ð3Þ
rt ¼ 1−δþ rk;t : ð4Þ
Here at is per capita household wealth at the beginning of time t, which equals holdings of capital kt owned by the house-
hold less their debt (to other households), bpt , i.e. at≡kt−bpt . rt is the gross interest rate for loans made to other households,
wt is the wage rate, ct is consumption, nt is labor supply and τh;t is per capita lump sum taxes. Eq. (4) arises due to the
absence of arbitrage from loans and capital being perfect substitutes as stores of value; rk;t is the rental rate on capital goods
and δ is the depreciation rate.
Households maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3) which yields the Euler equation for consumption
c−st ¼ βE^ trtþ1c−stþ1: ð5Þ
We next derive the (linearized) consumption function.
From the flow budget constraint (3) we can get the intertemporal budget constraint (in realized terms)
0¼ rtat þ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
ðDt;tþjðtÞÞ−1χtþj þ χt ð6Þ
where
Dt;tþj ¼∏ji ¼ 1rtþi; j≥1 and χt≡wtnt−ct−τh;t
by assuming the condition D−1t;tþjatþjþ1-0 as j-∞ holds (which is obtained by combining the transversality and the no-
ponzi game conditions).
Note that (6) involves future choices of labor supply by the household which we next eliminate to derive the linearized
consumption function. For this we make use of the static first order condition (between consumption and labor supply)
from the household's problem which can be written as
nt ¼ 1−ζ1=ϵcs=ϵt w−ð1=ϵÞt : ð7Þ
This gives a relationship between labor supply and consumption choices which can be used to substitute out ntþj in (6).
Taking expectations we then get the expected value intertemporal budget constraint
0¼ rtat þ ðwt−ζ1=ϵcs=ϵt w1−ð1=ϵÞt −ct−τh;tÞ þ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
E^ tðDt;tþjÞ−1fwtþj−ζ1=ϵcs=ϵtþjw
1−ð1=ϵÞ
tþj −ctþj−τh;tþjg:
To obtain its optimal choice of consumption ct, we assume that the household uses a consumption function based on a
linearization around steady state values. In particular, we assume that agents linearize the expected value intertemporal
budget constraint and the Euler equations around the initial steady state values c; a;w; τh and r ¼ β−1. This is a natural choice
since agents can be assumed to have estimated precisely the steady state values before the policy change that takes place.109 As shown in King et al. (1988), log utility for consumption is needed for steady state labor supply along a balanced growth path. Campbell (1994,
Section 3) uses (2) with s¼ 1.
10 Thus we assume that the final steady state values of k,w and r are not initially known to agents. Under least-squares learning agents will eventually
come to know the new steady state values as happens in all of the simulations below. We remark that an alternative approach to our procedure would be to
assume that agents also update over time the point around which the consumption function is linearized, with the sequence of linearization points chosen
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obtain the consumption function
ðct−cÞCAA ¼ aðrt−rÞ þ β−1ðat−aÞ−ðτh;t−τhÞ þ Cwwðwt−wÞ−CrrSret−Sτeh;t þ CwwSwet ; ð8Þ
where CAA;Cww and Crr are given in the Appendix and where
Sret≡ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
βjþ1 ∑
j
i ¼ 1
ðretþi−rÞ; ð9Þ
Sτeh;t≡ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
βjðτeh;tþj−τhÞ; ð10Þ
Swet≡ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
βjðwetþj−wÞ; ð11Þ
denote “present value” type expressions.
Eq. (8) specifies a behavioral rule for the household's choice of current consumption based on pre-determined values of
initial assets, real interest rates, wage rates, current values of lump-sum taxes and (subjective) expectations of future values
of wages, interest rates, and lump-sum taxes. Expectations are assumed to be formed at the beginning of period t and, for
simplicity, we assume these to be identical across agents (though agents themselves do not know this to be the case). Eq. (8)
can then be viewed as the behavioral rule for per capita consumption in the economy. Note that ct, nt and wt are simul-
taneously determined given expectations.
To implement the behavioral rule, however, the household requires forecasts retþi;w
e
tþj, and τ
e
h;tþj. For taxes τ
e
h;tþj (and τh)
we assume that agents use “structural” knowledge based on announced government spending rules. For convenience
we assume balanced budgets, so that τh;tþj ¼ gtþj.11 For retþi and wetþj we assume households estimate future values using a
VAR-type model in kt ;wt ; rk;t and vt, with coefficients updated over time by recursive least squares (RLS). The detailed
procedure is described in Section 3.1.
Linearizing Eq. (7) we also obtain the employment equation, which will be useful later
nt−n ¼ −s
ϵ
ζ1=ϵðwÞ−1ϵcsϵ−1ðct−cÞ þ 1wϵ ζ
1=ϵðwÞ−1=ϵcs=ϵðwt−wÞ:
To complete the model, we describe the evolution of the other state variables, namely wt ; rk;t ; rt ; yt and ktþ1. Households
own capital and labor services which they rent to firms. The firm uses these inputs to produce output yt using the Cobb–
Douglas production technology
yt ¼ vtkαt n1−αt ;
where vt is the technology shock that follows an AR(1) process
v^t ¼ ρv^t−1 þ ~ut ;
with v^t ¼ ðvt−vÞ. Here v is the mean of the process and ~ut is an iid zero-mean process with constant variance s2u.12
Profit maximization by firms implies the standard first-order conditions involving wages and rental rates
wt ¼ ð1−αÞvt
kt
nt
 α
and rk;t ¼ αvt
nt
kt
 1−α
:
In equilibrium, aggregate private debt bpt is zero, so that at ¼ kt , and market clearing determines ktþ1 from
ktþ1 ¼ vtkαt n1−αt þ ð1−δÞkt−ct−gt ; ð12Þ
where gt is per capita government spending.
For simulations of the model we follow standard procedures and approximate the path using a linearization around the
steady state.13 The linearized equations for the wage rate, rental rate, real interest rate, output and capital accumulation
equations, together with the equations giving the steady state, are given in the Appendix.(footnote continued)
to be consistent with the agent's estimates of the new steady-state values. Provided the changes in government spending are not too large, it is satisfactory
to use our simpler procedure of using a fixed linearization point.
11 Balanced budgets are not as restrictive as it may appear, since under suitable assumptions Ricardian equivalence can continue to hold under adaptive
learning. See Evans et al. (2012).
12 For simplicity we do not include a trend in technical progress. This would be straightforward to add, but doing so would require choosing between a
deterministic and a stochastic trend, and it would substantially complicate the presentation.
13 It is also straightforward to simulate the model under learning using the exact (nonlinear) equations for yt ;wt ; rk;t ; rt and ktþ1. For the model at hand
we have found the results for the two methods to be very similar. Simulations using linear approximations are much faster, however, so we have used these
in the reported results.
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absence of a policy change, under RE the endogenous variables, ktþ1; ct ;nt ;wt ; rk;t ; rt , can be written as approximate linear
function of kt and vt, e.g. Campbell (1994). In particular
k^tþ1 ¼ λ2k^t þ f kvv^t ; ð13Þ
w^t ¼ f wkk^t þ f wvv^t ; ð14Þ
r^ k;t ¼ f rkk^t þ f rvv^t ; ð15Þ
where the hatted values are deviations from the RE deterministic steady state, i.e. k^t ¼ kt−k, r^ k;t ¼ rk;t−rk, w^t ¼wt−w, etc.
The RE solution takes the form of a stationary VAR(1) in the state x^t≡ k^ tv^ t
 
k^tþ1
v^tþ1
 !
¼ B k^t
v^t
 !
þ 0
1
 
~utþ1; ð16Þ
B¼
λ2 f kv
0 ρ
 !
; ð17Þ
with the other variables given by linear combinations of the state. Note also that under RE forecasts of future w^tþj and r^ k;tþj
are given by linear combinations of the forecasted future state x^etþj ¼ Bjx^t .
We now turn to obtaining the dynamics, under both RE and learning, when there is a policy change.
3. Permanent policy changes
At the beginning of period t¼1, a policy announcement is made that the level of government spending will change
permanently upward from g to g ′ at a specified date Tp in the future. The policy announcement is assumed to be credible
and known to the agents with certainty. With a balanced budget, this means equivalently that there is an anticipated change
in (per capita) taxes, i.e. τh;t ¼ τ ¼ g when toTp and τh;t ¼ τ′¼ g ′ when t≥Tp.
The long run effects on the steady state of an increase in government expenditure are well-known, e.g. Baxter and King
(1993). The new steady state involves lower consumption and higher levels of investment, output, labor, and capital, but an
unchanged capital-labor ratio. The latter implies that steady state wages and interest rates are unchanged. The method for
obtaining the impact of policy changes under RE is standard, see Appendix C for the details.
3.1. Learning dynamics
We now consider the learning dynamics in the context of the policy change just described. In the standard adaptive
learning approach, private agents would formulate an econometric model to forecast future taxes as well as interest rates
and wage rates, since these are required in order for agents to solve for their optimal level of consumption. We continue to
follow this approach with respect to interest rates and wage rates, but take the radically different approach for forecasting
taxes by assuming that agents understand the future course of taxes implied by the announced policy. In effect, we are
giving the agents structural knowledge of one part of the economy: the fiscal implications of the announced future change
in government spending.14
As argued in the Introduction, we think this is a natural way to proceed, since changes in agents' own future taxes have a
quantifiable direct effect, while future wages and interest rates are determined through dynamic general equilibrium effects.
The adaptive learning perspective is that it is unrealistic to assume that agents understand the economic structure
sufficiently well to improve on reduced form econometric forecasts of aggregate variables like wages and interest rates.
To keep things simple, we assume that the government operates and is known to operate under a balanced-budget rule.
Given this structural knowledge of the government budget constraint and the announced path of government spending, the
agents can thus use τ ¼ g , for toTp, and τ′¼ g ′, for t≥Tp, for their forecasts of future taxes. Of course, for simplicity we are
assuming that the announced policy change is fully credible. It would be possible to relax this assumption within the general
framework of our approach.
Since the path of future taxes τtþj ¼ gtþj is known to agents, they compute its present value as
Sτeh;t ¼ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
βjðgtþj−gÞ ¼
βTp−tþ1
1−β
ðg ′−gÞ; 1≤t≤Tp−1
β
1−β
ðg ′−gÞ; t≥Tp:
8>><
>>:14 A related approach is followed in Preston (2006) and Eusepi and Preston (2010) in connection with monetary policy: in some cases agents are
assumed to incorporate the announced interest-rate rule in their forecasts.
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their individual consumption choice in (8).
Under RE, agents are assumed to know all the underlying parameters involved in the REE solution, i.e. the parameters
in (14)–(16), which they use to form future forecasts of wages and rental rates. For anticipated changes in policy the implicit
assumptions under RE are even stronger: agents need to know the full structural model and use it to deduce the full equilibrium
path that puts the economy on the new saddle path at the exact time at which the policy change takes place. Furthermore this
computation by agents must be made under the assumption that other agents are equally “rational” and make the same
computation. From the learning perspective, these assumptions are implausibly strong and hence unrealistic.
Under learning wage and interest rate forecasts depend on the perceived laws of motion (PLMs) of the agents, with
parameters updated over time in response to the data. We consider PLMs given by `(13)–(15) in which future capital, wages,
and rental rates depend on the current capital stock and technological shock, kt and vt. That is, we consider PLMs that are of
the form (including constants)
ktþ1 ¼ bk þ akkkt þ akvv^t þ noise; ð18Þ
wt ¼ bw þ awkkt þ awvv^t þ noise; ð19Þ
rk;t ¼ br þ arkkt þ arvv^t þ noise; ð20Þ
v^t ¼ ρv^t−1 þ ~ut ; ð21Þ
where the PLM parameters bk, akk etc. will be estimated on the basis of actual data. The final line is the stochastic process
for evolution of the (de-meaned) technological shock, which for simplicity is assumed known to the agents. In real-time
learning, the parameters in (18)–(20) are time dependent and are updated using RLS; see for example [Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001, p. 233]. We assume agents allow for structural change, which would include policy changes as well as
other potential structural breaks, by discounting older data as discussed below.
In assuming that agents forecast using the PLM (18)–(21), we are implicitly assuming that they do not have useful information
available from previous policy changes. We think this is generally plausible, since policy changes are relatively infrequent and
since the qualitative and quantitative details of previous policy changes are unlikely to be the same. In particular, any previous
fiscal policy changes, of the type considered here, are likely to have varied in terms of the magnitude and duration of the change
in government spending, the extent to which it was anticipated, and the state of the economy in which it was announced and
implemented. Since older information of this type would probably have limited value, we assume that agents respond to policy
change by updating the parameters of the PLM (18)–(20) as new data become available.15
Before discussing how the PLM coefficients are updated over time using least-squares learning, we describe how (18)–(20)
are used by agents to make forecasts. Given coefficient estimates and the observed state ðkt ; v^tÞ, Eqs. (18) and (21) can be
iterated forward to obtain forecasts ketþj and v^tþj for j¼ 1;2;…. Wage and rental rate forecasts wetþj; rek;tþj are then obtained
using the relationships (19) and (20), with estimated coefficients, and interest-rate forecasts are given by retþj ¼ 1−δþ rek;tþj
using (4). Given these forecasts, Swt
e
and Srt
e
are computed from (11) and (9), which in turn are used in (8) to help determine
consumption in the temporary equilibrium. For further details see the Appendix.
Parameter updating by agents using RLS learning is as follows. We define the time t parameter estimates as
ϕk;t ¼
bk;t
akk;t
akv;t
0
B@
1
CA; ϕw;t ¼
bw;t
awk;t
awv;t
0
B@
1
CA; ϕrk;t ¼
br;t
ark;t
arv;t
0
B@
1
CA; zt ¼
1
kt
v^t
0
B@
1
CA:
The RLS formulas corresponding to estimates of Eq. (18) then are
ϕk;t ¼ ϕk;t−1 þ γR−1t zt−1ðkt−ϕ′k;t−1zt−1Þ; ð22Þ
Rt ¼ Rt−1 þ γðzt−1z′t−1−Rt−1Þ: ð23Þ
Here we are assuming that agents update parameter estimates using “discounted least squares,” i.e. they discount past data
geometrically at rate 1−γ, where 0oγo1 is a (typically) small positive number.16 In the learning literature the parameter γ
is known as the “gain,” and discounted least squares is also called “constant-gain” least squares. ϕw;t and ϕrk;t are estimated
in the same way, see below.
Constant-gain least squares is widely used in the adaptive learning literature because it weights recent data more
heavily. See for example Sargent (1999), Cho et al. (2002), McGough (2006), Orphanides and Williams (2007), Ellison and
Yates (2007), Huang et al. (2009), Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2008), Eusepi and Preston (2011) and Milani (2011).
In the current context constant gain is particularly natural since agents will be aware that the announced policy change will15 However, in Section 4, we consider the implications of using past changes in government spending to re-initialize the parameter estimates following
the policy change. Also, if repeated policy changes take place that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, then agents might plausibly make use of this
information using procedures along the lines of Section 4 of Evans et al. (2009).
16 Giving a constant weight of γ to the most recent data point implies discounting older data as the sample size increases.
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rule allows parameter estimates to more quickly track changes in parameter values than does straight (“decreasing-gain”)
least squares.
Analogously, the RLS formulas corresponding to estimates of Eqs. (19) and (20) are
ϕw;t ¼ ϕw;t−1 þ γR−1t zt−1ðwt−1−ϕ′w;t−1zt−1Þ; ð24Þ
ϕrk;t ¼ ϕrk;t−1 þ γR−1t zt−1ðrk;t−1−ϕ′rk;t−1zt−1Þ: ð25Þ
with Rt being given by (23). Note that we have set the gain to be the same in all of the regressions (this is done only for
simplicity and is not essential). The initial values of all parameter estimates ϕ and R are set to the initial steady state values
under RE. See Appendix B for details.3.2. Surprise permanent policy change
We first consider the benchmark case of a surprise change in government spending that takes place immediately. This is a
scenario that is frequently studied in the RE literature (see e.g. Baxter and King, 1993; Aiyagari et al., 1992; Romer, 2011).17
It would, therefore, be of interest to study a surprise policy change under learning and compare with the corresponding RE
dynamics. As we will see this provides interesting insights.18
Fig. 1 compares the dynamics under RE and learning for an increase in government spending that takes place in period 1
and which was not anticipated by agents. The variables plotted are capital (kt), gross investment (it ¼ ktþ1−ð1−δÞkt),
consumption (ct), labor (nt), output (yt), capital-labor ratio (kt=nt), wages (wt) and the interest rate (rt). In all of the figures
below, period t¼0 depicts the initial steady state values of the variables. We assume the following parametric form for the
figures: s¼ ϵ¼ 1; ζ¼ 4; δ¼ 0:025; α¼ 1=3; β¼ 0:985; ρ¼ 0:9, v ¼ 1:359, g0 ¼ 0:20, and γ ¼ 0:04 in the learning rule.
The parameter values used conform to the ones used in the real business cycle literature, see e.g. King and Rebello (1999)
or Heijdra (2009). The value of β used implies a quarterly real rate of interest of 1.5% (6% annually); the value of δ implies
an annualized rate of depreciation of 10% per annum; v ¼ 1:359 is chosen to normalize output to (approximately) unity.
The government spending/output ratio is 21%, that of investment/output ratio is 20% and that of consumption/output ratio is
59%. In our baseline case, the initial steady state values are n ¼ 0:22; k ¼ 8:29; c ¼ 0:59; w ¼ 3:04.
Our choice of the gain parameter γ ¼ 0:04 is in line with most of the literature, e.g. Branch and Evans (2006), Orphanides
and Williams (2007) and Milani (2007). Eusepi and Preston (2011) use a much smaller value for the gain, but they do not
consider changes in policy, for which a larger value of γ is more appropriate.19
~ut is assumed to be distributed uniformly with a support of (−0.005, 0.005). For the policy exercises, there is an increase
in government spending from g0 ¼ 0:20 to g ¼ 0:21 (a 5% increase) that takes place at t¼1. We plot the mean time paths for
each endogenous variable over 20,000 replications. We focus attention on the mean time path across replications since this
is the most salient aspect of the differences between the RE and learning dynamics when there is a change in policy.
We first describe the dynamics under RE of the surprise increase in government expenditure. These dynamics are
standard; see for instance Baxter and King (1993, pp. 321–322) and Heijdra (2009, Chapter 15). We can get some
(qualitative) intuition from the saddle path dynamics considered in Heijdra (2009, Figs. 15.1 and 15.2)], in the deterministic
continuous-time RBC model for such a surprise, permanent change. This is reproduced as our Fig. 7 at the end of the paper.
The CSE0, CE0 lines represent the initial capital stock and consumption equilibrium lines respectively with E0 the initial
steady state. CSE1 is the capital stock equilibrium line after the increase in government spending and the new steady state
is E1. Consumption falls immediately on impact from point E0 to point A on the new saddle path (SP1) in Fig. 7, i.e.
consumption under-shoots the new steady state E1 on impact. Thereafter, the dynamics for consumption and capital are
monotonically increasing along SP1 to the new steady state E1.
These RE qualitative dynamics are confirmed by the behavior of ct , kt in Fig. 1, which also illustrates the dynamics of
other important endogenous variables nt ; it , yt ; kt=nt ;wt , and rt . Intuitively, the permanent increase in government spending
has a large wealth effect on individuals, reducing their permanent income. Since neither consumption nor leisure are
inferior goods, individuals respond by reducing consumption and leisure dramatically, so that labor supply increases.
Consumption under-shoots (and labor supply over-shoots) the new steady state on impact as shown in Fig. 1. Since the
capital stock is predetermined, the boost in labor input on impact increases output and the real interest rate and reduces
wages. In the short run, there is a boom in investment leading to a rising path of capital. All variables then move
monotonically towards the new steady state.17 Baxter and King (1993) analyze surprise permanent and temporary changes in government spending in the neoclassical model while Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2012, Chapter 11) analyze some anticipated changes in policy in deterministic neoclassical models with elastic and inelastic labor supply.
18 In the notation of Section 3.1, for the surprise permanent change, the dynamics under learning has Sτeh;t ¼ ðβ=ð1−βÞÞðg ′−g Þ for all t≥1 since the
anticipatory effects are absent when the policy change takes the agents by surprise.
19 Our results are qualitatively robust to a range of values for the gain parameter; see Section 4 for a discussion. The learning rule uses a projection
facility to keep the dynamics of capital bounded since the autoregressive root of the capital process in the RE equilibrium is close to one. The projection
facility is set to be used outside the range (0.01,0.99); however, it is not used at all with our baseline gain of 0.04.
Fig. 1. Dynamic paths for a surprise permanent increase in government spending. The solid lines are the learning paths while the dashed lines are the RE
paths. The horizontal dashed lines depict the old and the new steady states. Mean paths over 20,000 simulations.
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–19711954Under learning, the most striking difference from RE is in the behavior of investment. Instead of the strong investment boom
that characterizes the RE dynamics, in the early periods under learning we have the opposite case of a large drop in
investment leading in fact to disinvestment (negative net investment ktþ1−kt ¼ it−δkt) and hence a falling path of capital in
the initial periods after the policy change. Why does this happen under learning? One way to view this is that at t¼1 agents
do not yet realize that the permanent increase in government spending will lead to a higher steady state capital stock; under
RLS learning, agents figure this out gradually as they accumulate more data and update their parameter estimates.
More specifically, in terms of the equilibrium dynamic system under learning, the mechanism is as follows. At t¼1,
consumption falls because of the increase in Sτeh;t . However, because wage and interest rate expectations are predetermined,
the fall in consumption and the increases in employment and output are all less than under RE. Under RE the paths of lower
future wt and higher rt are fully anticipated, magnifying the impact relative to the learning path in which expectations are
initially unchanged. Under learning wetþs; r
e
tþs gradually respond to the data, leading initially to a gradual fall in w
e
tþs (and rise
in retþsÞ before eventually rising towards the steady state.
As a consequence of the smaller sizes of the impacts on output and consumption at t¼1, the increase in g necessarily
leads to a lower level of it under learning than under RE, and in fact we see a sharp reduction in investment. In the periods
immediately following the policy change, expectations of wages and interest rates adjust. Two factors are at work. The lower
capital stock in the periods soon after the policy change leads to lower forecasts of future wages and higher forecasts of
future interest rates and thus lower Swt
e
and higher Srt
e
. This leads to a further reduction in ct, and increases in nt and yt,
which results in increases in it from its low level at t¼1. After several periods this process is sufficient to restore kt to an
Table 1
Impact effects on key variables (in percentage terms) of a permanent policy change under rational expectations (RE) and under learning (RLS) for the
surprise and announced changes.
Impact Surp Surp Tp ¼ 5 Tp ¼ 5 Tp ¼ 29 Tp ¼ 29
Effects RE RLS RE RLS RE RLS
ct −0.90 −0.34 −0.66 −0.31 −0.10 −0.22
nt 1.47 0.55 1.08 0.51 0.17 0.36
it 2.49 −2.07 5.38 2.55 0.86 1.78
yt 0.98 0.37 0.72 0.34 0.12 0.24
kt=nt −1.45 −0.55 −1.07 −0.51 −0.17 −0.36
wt −0.49 −0.18 −0.36 −0.17 −0.06 −0.12
rt 0.04 0.015 0.03 0.014 0.005 0.009
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–1971 1955upward path, accompanied by a fall in nt, and an increase in kt=nt drives wt upwards and rt downwards to their steady state
values. In addition, coefficient estimates under RLS learning gradually adjust in response to the shock and the evolution of
the data. Eventually the coefficients converge to a distribution centered on the REE values corresponding to the new
steady state.
Table 1, compares these impact effects under RE and learning. Compared to RE the paths of ct ;nt and kt=nt under learning
adjust less on impact and respond more sluggishly, leading to a hump-shaped response of ct, nt and it, with it eventually
overshooting the new steady state (in effect this compensates for the low levels of investment in the initial periods).20 This
also implies that the paths followed by ct ;nt and kt=nt (and hence wt and rtÞ in the periods following the policy change are
qualitatively in opposite directions under learning compared to that under RE; e.g. ct , wt are falling under learning initially
whereas they are rising under RE.
3.3. Anticipated permanent policy change
We now examine the effects of an anticipated change in policy that is announced credibly in period 1. The dynamic
effects under both RE and learning depend on how far in advance the policy change is announced. We, therefore, consider
two values of Tp in what follows. Fig. 2 plots the dynamics for an anticipated, permanent increase in government spending to
take place in period t¼5, i.e. Tp ¼ 5. We interpret a period as a quarter and frequently refer to this as an announcement one
year in advance. The parameter values used are the same as those for Fig. 1 (and in fact in all of the figures below). Fig. 3
illustrates the dynamics when Tp ¼ 29 (we refer to this as an announcement seven years in advance).
We first summarize the effects of the policy change under RE. We can again use Fig. 7 to help us understand the dynamics.
When Tp is small (like Tp ¼ 5 in Fig. 2), the impact effect on ct at t¼1 is quite large (though smaller than that for the surprise
change) and it under-shoots the new steady state E1. The dynamics, thereafter, is governed by the phase diagram implied by
the curves CE0, CSE0 since gt is unchanged until Tp. The phase diagram implies that ct and kt rise monotonically during the
anticipatory phase until the saddle path SP1 is hit when Tp¼5 (and the dynamics are then governed by the CE0, CSE1 lines).
Thereafter, the paths of ct and kt continue to increase monotonically along SP1 until the steady state E1 is reached.
When Tp is large (like 29 in Fig. 3), the impact effect on ct at t¼1 is much smaller and does not under-shoot the new steady
state E1. ct and kt rise monotonically initially until the dynamics hits the CE0 line. Thereafter, ct falls but kt continues to rise until the
new saddle path SP1 is reached at Tp ¼ 29. The paths of ct and kt then monotonically decrease along SP1 towards the new steady
state E1. Thus, kt increases monotonically until t¼29 over-shooting the new steady state before a gradual decrease.
These effects are confirmed by the dynamics under RE shown in Figs. 2 and 3. For example, ct falls on impact with
over-shooting of ct observed on impact in Fig. 2 but not in Fig. 3. kt over-shoots the new steady state under RE when Tp ¼ 29
(see Fig. 3) but not when Tp ¼ 5 (see Fig. 2).
Under learning, only the announced increase in future taxes reduces ct at t¼1, by Eq. (8), since expectations of wages and
interest rates are pre-determined. The impact effects under learning (like that under RE) are reduced as Tp increases.
However, compared to RE, the impact effects are smaller under learning when Tp is small (see Fig. 2) while they are larger
when Tp is large (see Fig. 3). Table 1 summarizes the impact effects in percentage terms for the surprise and the announced
permanent changes illustrated in Figs. 1–3.
We consider the dynamics under learning in more detail for the case Tp ¼ 29.21 The initial fall in consumption, due to the
higher anticipated future taxes Sτeh;t , leads to a temporary investment boom and a period of capital accumulation. However,
under learning this is soon followed by a considerable period in advance of Tp ¼ 29, specifically t ¼ 4;…;23, in which there
are higher wages and expected wages, Swt
e
, and lower interest rates and expected interest rates, Srt
e
than under RE. These20 In RBC models with learning, hump-shaped responses to productivity shocks have been observed by Eusepi and Preston (2011), Branch and
McGough (2011), and Huang et al. (2009). The latter also emphasize the plausible labor market dynamics that arise from the learning model. However,
none of these papers focus on changes in government spending.
21 For Tp ¼ 5 the qualitative dynamics are similar under learning, except that the overshooting of ct ;wt , and rt is not observed in the pre-
implementation period.
Fig. 2. Dynamic paths for an anticipated permanent increase in government spending taking place in period 5. The solid lines are the learning paths while
the dashed lines are the RE paths. The horizontal dashed lines depict the old and new steady states. Mean paths over 20,000 simulations.
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compared to the RE path. As a result, the qualitative dynamics of nt and yt under learning are actually opposite to that under
RE throughout most of the pre-implementation phase, in the sense that nt and yt are falling over time under learning
whereas they rise over time fairly dramatically under RE.
Continuing with the learning scenario, the optimistic assumptions of high future wages and low future interest rates
offset the higher expected taxes Sτeh;t , and consequently when Tp ¼ 29 arrives, employment is back to initial levels and
consumption is actually slightly larger than it was initially. During period Tp ¼ 29 when the government spending increases,
there is virtually no impact on ct or nt, or on wt ; rt , since the tax increases had been fully anticipated. Consequently almost
the full impact of the increase in g at Tp is on it and thus on ktþ1. This corresponds to a similar decrease in it in the RE case.
However, in the learning case the fall in the capital stock after Tp ¼ 29, during periods t¼30–35, leads to a sharp reduction in
wages and a sharp increase in interest rates that were not correctly anticipated by agents. There is then a sustained period
for t4Tp of low ct, low wt, high rt and high nt , (with both nt and it overshooting their new higher steady state levels),
as agents adjust their expectations to the post-policy implementation reality, with eventual convergence to the new
steady state.
To summarize, only the direct wealth effects from the anticipated change in government spending (and taxes) are fully
foreseen under learning in the anticipatory phase. Under learning, in contrast to RE, agents do not correctly foresee the path of
future wages and interest rates. This leads to overoptimism concerning wages and interest rates in the pre-implementation period,
and a substantial correction following implementation, with a period of low wages, low consumption and high interest rates.
Fig. 3. Dynamic paths for an anticipated permanent increase in government spending taking place in period 29. The solid lines are the learning paths while
the dashed lines are the RE paths. The horizontal dashed lines depict the old and new steady states. Mean paths over 20,000 simulations.
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For both surprise and anticipated permanent increases in g we see the following main qualitative features:1. There are large impact effects for both the RE and learning solutions, and these effects get smaller as Tp increases. The
impact effects under learning are smaller than under RE for surprise changes but the opposite is true when Tp is large.2. The dynamics of variables under RE and learning can be in qualitatively opposite directions for some periods after the
impact effects. For the surprise change, kt, ct are falling after the policy change under learning while they are rising under
RE (nt is rising under learning and falling under RE during this time). These features lead to a hump-shaped response
in variables under learning that is absent under RE. Similarly, for the announced change, it ;nt , and yt are all falling under
learning in the pre-implementation phase whereas they are all rising under RE in this time period.3. For anticipated future permanent changes in g, under learning there is essentially no impact on c or n on the date when
the policy is implemented, and in this respect is like RE. The reasons are the same: the tax change is fully anticipated and
agents aim to smooth their consumption path.
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–197119584. There can be classic “overshooting” results for both learning and RE paths. For example, in the case of an announced
increase in g when Tp is large, the path for kt rises above the new higher steady state before eventually converging to
it under RE. However, overshooting is a far more prominent feature of learning paths; for an announced change in g,
consumption falls instantaneously before gradually rising until Tp; there is then a substantial fall in c under-shooting the
new steady state before converging to it.5. Related to this last point, the learning paths exhibit oscillatory convergence that is particularly pronounced for
announced policy changes. For example, in the announced case, under learning, kt, after its initial rise, falls for a period
before increasing and eventually converging. Other variables like ct, nt, yt, kt=nt (hence, wt and rt) all exhibit oscillatory
convergence as well.
We now discuss the intuition for the results under learning. The key feature is that the effects from the change
in expected future government spending and taxes are felt immediately (since agents foresee the path of gt even under
learning), while the implications for expected future wages and interest rates evolve gradually in response to the data.
Consider the effect of an anticipated permanent increase in g illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3. On announcement of the future
increase in g, agents immediately understand the implications for their wealth of their future higher taxes and they adjust
their consumption and labor supply accordingly. During the period toTp they also revise their expectations of future wages
and interest rates in response to the data. What they do not foresee, however, is that when the policy is implemented this
will lead to a crowding out of capital that will in turn eventually reduce wages and increase interest rates. Consequently, for
t4Tp there is another period of adjustment as agents learn the properties of the new equilibrium steady state.
How reasonable is our implicit assumption that agents will not foresee the extent to which capital is crowded out by g in
the period following implementation? We think this is very plausible. For agents to deduce that there will be the decline in
the capital stock following Tp they would need not only to understand the capital accumulation equation (12), but also to
accurately forecast aggregate consumption ct and aggregate labor supply nt during the period following Tp. As we have already
indicated in our earlier discussion of RE, this in turn requires an implausibly high degree of structural knowledge of the
economy, as well as a belief that this structural information is common knowledge, that all agents are fully rational and
capable of computing equilibrium paths, and that this is common knowledge.22 These are precisely the assumptions that the
adaptive learning literature aims to avoid.
The approach taken in this paper is to examine the implications of assuming that agents have some structural
information pertinent to their decision problem, here the path of future taxes, but that they use econometric forecasting
procedures for other key variables. An implication of our approach is that agents are likely to make systematic mistakes
when confronted with announced future increases in government spending: while the tax implications will be understood,
agents may become overoptimistic in advance of the policy implementation, leading to a subsequent correction.
3.5. Oscillatory dynamics under learning
We have noted that oscillatory dynamics is a prominent feature under learning. The system under learning combines two
types of dynamics. First consider the case of the permanent surprise increase in g. Under RE the policy change in effect re-
initializes the system so that the “initial” capital stock is below its new steady state values. Under RE the system dynamics
are inherently monotonic, along the new saddle path, since the state is given by (16) and (17), which implies that the path of
capital follows:
ktþ1 ¼ bk þ akkkt þ akvv^t ;
where bk; akk ¼ λ′2 and akv denote new steady-state values.
Under learning the system dynamics are driven by the values of the forecast parameters as well as by the current state
variables. The forecast functions (18)–(20) are characterized by a vector of estimated coefficients θ¼ ðbk; akk; akv; bw; awk;
awv; br ; ark; arvÞ, which are updated over time using RLS. If, at the time of the policy change, the coefficient values for θ
changed immediately to the new RE values bk, akk, akv, and the other coefficients changed analogously, then our temporary
equilibrium system would replicate the REE.
Under adaptive learning, however, the coefficients gradually evolve towards the new RE values in response to data and
the RLS updating scheme. One can show the actual law of motion (ALM) dynamics for given parameters θ takes the same
form as the PLM but with parameters TðθÞ instead of θ. The mapping T : R9-R9 can be computed numerically and REE
parameter values are a fixed point θ ¼ TðθÞ. Under learning the parameters θðtÞ evolve over time. Denoting θnðtÞ ¼ TðθðtÞÞ and
using bnkðtÞ, etc., for the components of θn, the (linearized) dynamics under learning are given by
ktþ1 ¼ bnkðtÞ þ ankkðtÞkt þ ankvðtÞv^t ;
wt ¼ bnwðtÞ þ anwkðtÞkt þ anwvðtÞv^t ;
rk;t ¼ bnr ðtÞ þ anrkðtÞkt þ anrvðtÞv^t :22 The strong assumptions required for agents to be able to deduce, and hence coordinate on RE, are discussed in Guesnerie (2002).
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(equal to θ at an REE) and the RLS dynamics governing the evolution of θðtÞ over time. The resulting system for the
endogenous variables is a nonlinear stochastic dynamic system that can include oscillatory responses to structural change.
For a surprise permanent increase in g, the hump-shaped response for kt ; it ; ct and nt results from this combined
dynamics. Immediately after the policy shock, PLM parameters are at the old steady state values θ . This leads to smaller
impact effects than under RE and a decline in kt. This leads to further movements of variables away from the new steady
state as discussed above. However, over time θðtÞ evolves towards the new REE values θ′, leading to the eventual monotonic
convergence seen in Fig. 1.23 For anticipated permanent increases in g, implementation in Tp leads to a second period of
oscillatory dynamics before convergence to the final steady state.
The importance of cyclical or oscillatory dynamics has been emphasized in RE models by, e.g. Farmer (1999, Chapter 7),
Farmer and Guo (1994) and Azariadis et al. (2004). These papers also argue that such dynamics are a feature of US data.
Farmer and Guo (1994) obtain cyclical dynamics in RBC-type models with nonconvexities (see also Baxter and King, 1991). In
Azariadis et al. (2004) the oscillatory dynamics arise from the overlapping generations structure. Our results indicate that
with adaptive learning, oscillatory dynamics can be expected to arise in response to fiscal policy or other structural changes
in standard RBC models. It would be interesting to examine this feature of adaptive learning in more detail and to compare
its implications with the data.24
4. Further results
In this section we consider two additional points. The first, which is more straightforward, is that we consider the impact
of the size of the learning gain parameter on our results. The second, which is methodologically more fundamental, is to
consider the possibility that agents use past variations in government spending to estimate the impact of the permanent
policy change on future wages and interest rates.
4.1. Effect of gain parameter
As earlier discussed the use of constant gain learning is particularly appropriate when there is structural change like the
policy change considered in this paper. It is clearly of interest to know the effect of the size of the gain parameter on the
dynamics. We restrict attention to the permanent surprise increase in government spending considered in Fig. 1. Fig. 4
shows the dynamics of it ; ct ;nt and yt for two alternative values of the gain parameter: γ ¼ 0:01 on the left and γ ¼ 0:08 on
the right. As can be seen the qualitative dynamics are essentially the same as in Fig. 1. For example, for each choice of the
gain ct falls less on impact compared to RE and follows a hump-shaped path that eventually falls below the RE path before
converging asymptotically to the new steady state.25
The main impact of the gain is that a smaller gain stretches out the time frame of the paths under learning. For example,
the minimum of the consumption path occurs in period 6 when γ ¼ 0:08, in period 8 when γ ¼ 0:04 and in period 16 when
γ ¼ 0:01.26 For the same reason, convergence to the new steady state is slower under learning when gains are smaller. As
noted in Section 3.5 the variable paths under learning combine two types of dynamics. The underlying reason for the time-
stretching effect of small gains is slower adjustment of the forecast parameters under learning, an effect which is well-
known in the learning literature.
Our benchmark choice of γ ¼ 0:04 is consistent with the empirical literature of adaptive learning. An alternative approach
would be to calibrate its value based on the choice that minimizes a criterion like forecast squared error, along the lines of
Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Chapter 14.3.4) or Marcet and Nicolini (2003). This is beyond the scope of the current paper.
4.2. Effect of prior on policy impact
In this section we extend the model to allow for the possibility that agents use past information concerning the impact
of government spending to form a prior estimate of the impact of the policy change. Specifically, we allow for temporary
fluctuations in government spending, which are included in agents' forecasting models. We then suppose that agents use
these past variations in government spending to estimate the impact of the permanent policy change on future wages and
interest rates.
Thus suppose that in addition to the steady state level of government spending g , there are temporary government
spending shocks g^ t that follow a stationary AR(1) process. We assume that before the policy change agents have estimated23 The mean dynamics of the parameter estimates are governed by the “E-stability” differential equation _θ ¼ TðθÞ−θ. Local asymptotic stability of an
REE θ is determined by the Jabobian matrix DTðθÞ. Numerically for our baseline parametrization, the nonzero eigenvalues are −4.50, −0.95, −0.64. Since all
the eigenvalues are less than one, the equilibrium is E-stable and therefore stable under least squares learning.
24 See Eusepi and Preston (2011) and Milani (2011) for empirically oriented studies in models with unchanged policy.
25 Another natural possibility would be for agents to reduce the size of the gain over time as the date of the policy change recedes into the past. Our
qualitative results are robust to such variations in the gain sequence.
26 As mentioned in Section 3.2, large gains lead to a more frequent use of the projection facility. Here for γ ¼ 0:08 the projection facility is used 1.3% of
the times, whereas it is not used at all when γ ¼ 0:01 or γ ¼ 0:04.
Fig. 4. Impact of gain parameter. The left hand side illustrates the dynamics with a smaller gain of 0.01 and the right hand side the dynamics with a larger
gain of 0.08. Solid lines show learning dynamics and dashed line the RE dynamics. Mean paths over 20,000 replications.
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attention to the case of an unanticipated permanent increase in g . Because there now is assumed to have been historical
variation of gt ¼ g þ g^ t , agents have estimates of the impact of g^ t on kt ;wt and rk;t . Earlier we argued against the use of this
information by agents on the grounds that the policy change would be sufficiently different from past experience to make
earlier fluctuations in gt of limited information value. However, it is possible that agents do use the past effects of g^ t in
forecasting the effects of the new policy.
To model this we assume now that agents have the following PLM, in which g^ t is included as an additional state variable
ktþ1 ¼ bk þ akkkt þ akvv^t þ akgg^ t þ akdDgt þ noise;
wt ¼ bw þ awkkt þ awvv^t þ awgg^t þ awdDgt þ noise;
rk;t ¼ br þ arkkt þ arvv^t þ argg^ t þ ardDgt þ noise;
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–1971 1961v^t ¼ ρv^t−1 þ ~ut and g^ t ¼ μg^ t−1 þ εt where 0oρ; μo1:
The variable Dgt is a discrete variable taking the value Dgt ¼ g ′−g for all t≥1 in the policy surprise case.
We assume that coming into t¼1 agents' estimates of the PLM have converged to the RE values corresponding to the
stationary environment in which gt ¼ g þ g^ t . However, in forecasting future ktþj;wtþj and rk;tþj we now allow for agents to
explicitly estimate and update over time, the impact of the increased permanent level of g using Dgt in their PLM. A key
question is the initial values akd; awd; ard assigned by agents at t¼1 when the surprise policy takes place.27 One possibility
is that they treat the coefficients ðakg ; awg ; argÞ on g^ t , which reflect the observed impact of temporary changes, as suitable
initial estimates of the impact of the permanent policy. More generally and plausibly agents would understand that the
impacts of temporary changes in g will be different from those of permanent changes, and use
akd ¼ ð1−ωÞakg ; awd ¼ ð1−ωÞawg and ard ¼ ð1−ωÞarg
for a shrinkage parameter 0≤ω≤1. This can be viewed as reflecting a prior belief for coefficients of Dgt being centered at
zero.28 Put differently, ω measures the distrust agents place on the relevance of ðakg ; awg ; argÞ for the policy change.
In contrast to Section 3, the inclusion of the dummy variable Dgt , with initial nonzero parameter estimates, implies that
agents now immediately project policy impacts on future wages and interest rates as well as on taxes. However, these initial
estimates are based on the experience of temporary changes g^ t , which as we have emphasized may provide poor guidance.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the results for a surprise permanent increase, when ρ¼ 0:95, μ¼ 0:7 and ω¼ 0:99 or ω¼ 0:5.29
The results for ω¼ 0:99 in Fig. 5 are quite close to those shown earlier in Fig. 1. This is not surprising given that ω¼ 1
corresponds closely to the framework used in the main body of the paper, in which initially forecasts were based on a PLM
initialized at the RE of the initial steady state, with parameters gradually adjusted over time at a rate controlled by the gain.30
For ω¼ 0:5 in Fig. 6, the results are very different, with sharp increases in investment, employment and output (and a
reduction in consumption) at the time of the policy change. These impacts now substantially exceed the response under RE.
These contrasting results stem from the initial values of ðakd; awd; ardÞ based on akg ¼−0:68, awg ¼−0:31 and arg ¼ 0:0082.
While these estimates do immediately capture the negative effect of higher g on future wages, they exaggerate the impact, and
this is further exacerbated through akdo0 by an estimated lower long-run level of the capital stock. These estimates are mistaken,
because the temporary effects of increases in gt are very different from the impact of permanent effects. In the basic RBC set-up,
temporary increases in gt under RE have a negative effect on capital while permanent increases have a positive effect on kt.
In summary, the pattern of under-reaction on impact, relative to RE, seen in Figs. 1 and 5, is replaced in Fig. 6 by over-reaction
on impact. For ω near one, agents initially do not anticipate the general equilibrium effects on wages, leading to under-reaction.
For small ω, agents assume the general equilibrium effects are like those from temporary government spending shocks, leading
instead to over-reaction. Eventually, of course, there is convergence to the new steady state in both cases.
These results illustrate the sensitivity of the response of the economy to the methods by which agents forecast the
general equilibrium effects of the policy change. The priors used to forecast future wages and interest rates modulate the
impact on ct and nt of the increase in future taxes.
5. Further discussion and literature review
We have employed a framework in which information about changes in the future path of fiscal policy change is incorpo-
rated into the adaptive learning approach to expectation formation. This approach has been informed by an established
literature on policy change in models with rational expectations.
We discussed classic references in the Introduction. In recent work, Ramey (2011) identifies news about future fiscal
policy changes and finds that whether or not government spending changes are anticipated has important implications for
reconciling different empirical findings about consumption and real wages. Ramey (2009) uses an RBC framework like ours
to illustrate theoretically the impact of news about future fiscal policy on the paths of aggregate variables. Our paper also
assumes knowledge of the path of future government spending, but we replace the assumption of rational expectations
about future wages and interest rates with forecasts based on adaptive learning. Our approach has quite different impli-
cations for impulse response functions, which could be tested in future econometric work.31
Similarly, Leeper et al. (2012) study the roles of the horizon and intensity of confidence, of fiscal news, within a calibrated New
Keynesian model. They show, for example, that “no-foresight fiscal multipliers are substantially different from multipliers when
there is substantial foresight.” While they emphasize the importance of correctly modeling the news process within a rational
expectations DSGE framework, we show that it is equally important to model correctly the expectations process of agents in27 The RLS moment matrix estimate Rt is now 55 and must also be initialized. For the 44 submatrix corresponding to the second-moment matrix
of ð1; kt ; v^t ; g^ t Þ we use the RE value. To this we append Rði;5Þ ¼ Rð5; iÞ ¼ 0 for i¼ 1;2;3;4 and Rð5;5Þ ¼ ðg ′−g Þ2. This implies that in the first period akd ; awd ,
and ard are simply adjusted by the forecast error times the gain.
28 This is particularly natural in the current case since the sign of the theoretical impact on capital of a permanent increase in g can be positive, zero or
negative, depending on the specific macroeconomic model employed.
29 μ¼ 0:7 is the median value used in Leeper et al. (2011). We set the standard deviation of εt at 0.003, slightly less than that of the productivity
innovation.
30 This allowed the intercept to adjust over time. Here the same role is played by adjustment over time in the coefficient on Dgt .
31 Leeper et al. (2008) discuss the difficulties in estimating the true impulse response functions when agents have foresight.
Fig. 5. Dynamic paths for a surprise permanent increase in government spending with the dummy variable included in agents's regression and ω¼ 0:99.
Solid lines are the learning paths while dashed lines are the RE paths. Mean paths over 20,000 simulations.
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–19711962forecasting the general equilibrium effects of policy changes. In related work of Mitra et al. (2012) we use our analysis to
demonstrate the implications of our approach for salient policy issues like government spending multipliers.
In this paper we have used the basic RBC model with lump-sum taxes, balanced budgets, and no frictions. We use this
stylized model in order to make as transparent as possible the importance of the lack of knowledge of the general
equilibrium effects of policy changes. Clearly our approach can be extended to allow for various frictions and distortions,
which would be desirable in subsequent theoretical extensions and particularly relevant for empirical work. We think it is
important that empirical work on the impact of fiscal policy changes allow for the nonlinear dynamics, induced by adaptive
learning, that are identified in this paper.
Other recent work, e.g. House and Shapiro (2006), Mertens and Ravn (2011), Yang (2005) and Strulik and Trimborn
(2010) look at anticipated changes in distortionary labor and capital taxes in RBC-type models, and some of the news
shocks papers, e.g. Beaudry and Portier (2007) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012), consider fiscal policy news shocks.
These papers emphasize partial knowledge about future policy changes like our work, but they employ the standard RE
assumption. Our approach can be developed further as a complement to these results.6. Conclusion
Changes in fiscal policy, in an RBC model with adaptive learning, generate mean trajectories that have both common
features and significant differences from the mean paths under RE. These dynamics were examined for surprise and
announced permanent fiscal changes. For announced policy changes scheduled to take place in the future, immediate
anticipation effects under learning arise from the wealth effects of anticipated future tax changes, followed by additional
more gradual impacts arising from changes in expected future wages and interest rates.32
The differences in dynamics under RE and adaptive learning therefore arise due to the future path of wages and interest
rates being fully foreseen by RE agents, while agents learn only gradually about these variables under incomplete32 We remark that our focus on anticipated future fiscal changes is reminiscent of the literature on news shocks about future productivity changes, see
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). The approach used in the current paper could naturally be extended to news shocks within their framework.
Fig. 6. Dynamic paths for a surprise permanent increase in government spending with the dummy variable included in agents's regression and ω¼ 0:5.
Solid lines are the learning paths while the dashed lines are the RE paths. Mean paths over 20,000 simulations.
Fig. 7. Effects under RE of fiscal policy in deterministic RBC model; based on Heijdra (2009, Figs. 15.1–15.2.)
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–1971 1963knowledge. In effect, under learning agents understand the direct wealth effects of future changes of government spending
and taxes, but fail to fully anticipate the effect on factor prices of the crowding out or crowding in of changes in government
spending.
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–19711964Depending on the form of the announced policy change, the size of the impact effects under learning can be either
greater or smaller than under RE. In some cases the qualitative dynamics of variables can be in diametrically opposite
directions under RE and learning. In addition, oscillatory dynamics emerge prominently as agents learn about the full impact
of the policy change and its effect on the new steady state.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A. Linearizations
The linearized wage rate, rental rate, and real interest rate equations are
wt−w ¼w vtv −1
 
þ α kt
k
−1
 
−α
nt
n
−1
  	
;
rk;t−rk ¼ rk
vt
v
−1
 
−ð1−αÞ kt
k
−1
 
þ ð1−αÞ nt
n
−1
  	
;
rt−r ¼ rk;t−rk:
The linearized output and capital accumulation equations are
yt−y ¼ y
vt
v
−1
 
þ α kt
k
−1
 
þ ð1−αÞ nt
n
−1
  	
;
ktþ1−k ¼ ðyt−yÞ−ðct−cÞ−ðgt−gÞ þ ð1−δÞðkt−kÞ:
The equations giving the steady state are
r ¼ 1−δþ rk ¼ β−1;
c ¼ vkαn1−α−δk−g ;
ζcs ¼wð1−nÞϵ;
w ¼ ð1−αÞv k
n
 !α
and rk ¼ αv
k
n
 !α−1
:
These five equations can be solved simultaneously to yield the steady state values of c; k;n;w, and rk given the value of g
and the structural parameters α; β; δ; ζ; s; ϵ.
Appendix B. Details of solutions under learning
Under learning, agents need to form forecasts of variables without full knowledge of the underlying model parameters. In
the basic formulation, announced policy changes are fully credible and, hence, future forecasts of lump-sum taxes are
assumed known to them. However, they still need to form forecasts of future wages and rental rates/interest rates in order
to determine their consumption choice in (8). In the learning literature, these forecasts depend on the perceived laws of
motion (PLMs) of the agents. We initially start with PLMs that correspond to the REE given in (13)–(15) in which wages, and
rental rates are estimated on the basis of data on capital stock and technological shock, kt and vt. Thus the PLMs (including
constants) of the agents are taken to be of the form of Eqs. (18)–(20), where the PLM parameters bk, akk; akv, etc., will be
estimated on the basis of actual data. The final line is the stochastic process for evolution of the (de-meaned) technological
shock which is assumed known to the agents (this is without loss of generality).
We will now write these PLMs in deviation form; with deviations under learning taken from the estimated steady state
values of capital, wage rate, and rental rate. Define
~kt ¼ kt−k
e
t ;
~rk;t ¼ rk;t−rek;t ;
~wt ¼wt−wet ; ð26Þ
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–1971 1965where, for instance, ~rk;t is the deviation of the rental rate from the steady state rental rate estimated under learning at time t
(i.e. rek;tÞ.
Using this notation we have
~ktþ1 ¼ akk ~kt þ akvv^t ; ð27Þ
~wt ¼ awk ~kt þ awvv^t ; ð28Þ
~rk;t ¼ ark ~kt þ arvv^t ; ð29Þ
where the estimated steady state values of capital, rental rates, and wages under learning are (omitting the time subscripts
on k
e
t , etc.)
k
e ¼ bk
1−akk
; ð30Þ
rek ¼ br þ ark
bk
1−akk
; ð31Þ
we ¼ bw þ awk
bk
1−akk
: ð32Þ
Then under learning, the form corresponding to (16) is
~ktþ1
v^tþ1
 !
¼ ~B
~kt
v^t
 !
þ
0
~utþ1
 !
;
~B ¼
akk akv
0 ρ
 !
:
Defining ~xt≡
~kt
v^ t
 
, we have for j≥1
~xetþj ¼ ~B
j
~xt : ð33Þ
Using the future forecasts of capital stocks from (33), we can in turn obtain the future forecasts of wages and rental rates
from (28) and (29) as
~wetþj ¼ ðawk awvÞ ~B
j
~xt ;
~rek;tþj ¼ ðark arvÞ ~B
j
~xt :
We linearize (5) around the deterministic steady state c and r ¼ β−1
ct−c ¼ E^ tðctþ1−cÞ−βs−1cE^tðrtþ1−rÞ: ð34Þ
As noted in the main text, we assume agents choose the (known) initial steady state as the point around which to linearize.
Iterate Eq. (34) forward to get
ct−c ¼ E^ tðctþj−cÞ−βs−1cE^t ∑
j
i ¼ 1
ðrtþi−rÞ;
which describes current consumption in terms of expected consumption j steps ahead and future short-term interest rates.
Having obtained the future forecasts of wages and interest rates under learning, we reproduce below the linearized
consumption function that agents use to determine their current consumption. First recall Eq. (8)
ðct−cÞCAA ¼ aðrt−rÞ þ rðat−aÞ−ðτh;t−τhÞ þ Cwwðwt−wÞ þ S1et þ S2et ; ð35Þ
where r ¼ β−1 in the deterministic steady state and
CAA≡
1
1−β
1þ s
ϵ
ζ1=ϵwðϵ−1Þ=ϵcðs=ϵÞ−1
 
;
Cww≡1−
ϵ−1
ϵ
ζ1=ϵcs=ϵw−1=ϵ:
S1et in (35) is defined as
S1et≡−SASr
e
t ; ð36Þ
SA ¼w−ζ1=ϵcs=ϵwðϵ−1Þ=ϵ−c−τh; ð37Þ
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–19711966and S2et is defined as
S2et ¼ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
r−j½Cwwðwetþj−wÞ−ðτeh;tþj−τhÞ−r−1
c
s
þ ζ
1=ϵcs=ϵw1−ð1=ϵÞ
ϵ
 !
∑
j
i ¼ 1
ðretþi−rÞ:
S2et can be rewritten as
S2et ¼ CwwSwet−Sτeh;t−
c
s
þ ζ
1=ϵcs=ϵw1−ð1=ϵÞ
ϵ
 !
Sret ; ð38Þ
where Sret , Sτ
e
h;t , and Swt
e
are given by Eqs. (9), (10), and (11) respectively.
If we combine the expressions in (36) and (38), we can write the consumption function (35) as
ðct−cÞCAA ¼ aðrt−rÞ þ rðat−aÞ−ðτh;t−τhÞ þ Cwwðwt−wÞ− SA þ
c
s
þ c
s=ϵζ1=ϵ
ϵ
w1−ð1=ϵÞ
 !
Sret þ CwwSwet−Sτeh;t
which is Eq. (8) in the text, with
Crr ¼ SA þ cs−1 þ cs=ϵζ1=ϵϵ−1w1−ð1=ϵÞ:
For the case s¼ ϵ¼ 1, the linearization coefficients are given by
CAA ¼ ð1þ ζÞ=ð1−βÞ; Cww ¼ 1 and Crr ¼w−τh;
and Eq. (8) reduces to
ct−c ¼ 1−β1þ ζ ½aðrt−rÞ þ rðat−aÞ−ðτh;t−τhÞ þ ðwt−wÞ−ðw−τhÞSr
e
t þ Swet−Sτeh;t :
For the calibrations assumed in the figures, w4τh, so that increases in Srt
e
and decreases in Swt
e
reduce current consumption
ct , as one would expect.
Since announced policy changes are assumed to be credible, future forecasts of taxes Sτeh;t coincide with the assumed
government fiscal rule in the consumption function (8). However, one still needs to obtain analytical expressions for Swt
e
and
Srt
e
which appear in (8). This is what we do now.
Note that using rt−r ¼ rk;t−rk along with (26) we obtain
rt−r ¼ ~rk;t þ rek;t−rk;
which after iterating forward gives us
rtþi−r ¼ ð~rk;tþi þ rek;t−rkÞ ¼ ðark arvÞ ~B
i
~xt þ ðrek;t−rkÞ;
since rek;tþi ¼ rek;t; i.e. the estimated steady state rental rate i steps ahead is still based on time t data and hence equals the
time t estimate rek;t given in (31). We use this to derive Srt
e
below. Observe that
∑
j
i ¼ 1
ðretþi−rÞ ¼ ðrek;t−rkÞjþ ðark arvÞ½ðI− ~BÞ−1 ~B−ðI− ~BÞ−1 ~B
jþ1 ~xt ;
since
∑
j
i ¼ 1
~B
i ¼ ðI− ~BÞ−1 ~B−ðI− ~BÞ−1 ~Bjþ1:
Using this Srt
e
is finally obtained as
Sret ¼
β2
ð1−βÞ2
ðrek;t−rkÞ þ β2ðark arvÞðI− ~BÞ−1 ~B½Ið1−βÞ−1− ~BðI−β ~BÞ−1 ~xt :
Similarly, since
ðwetþi−wÞ ¼ ðwet−w þwetþi−wet Þ ¼ ðwet−wÞ þ ~wetþi;
Swt
e
can be obtained from
Swet ¼ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
βjðwet−wÞ þ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
βj ~wtþj
¼ β
1−β
ðwet−wÞ þ ∑
∞
j ¼ 1
βjðawk awvÞ ~B
j
~xt
¼ β
1−β
ðwet−wÞ þ ðawk awvÞβ ~BðI−β ~BÞ−1 ~xt :
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–1971 1967Finally, we give details concerning the initialization of the parameters under RLS learning discussed in Section 3.1. The
initial values of all parameter estimates are set to the initial steady state values under RE, i.e.
ϕk;0 ¼
bk;0
akk;0
akv;0
0
B@
1
CA¼
ð1−λ2Þk
λ2
f kv
0
BB@
1
CCA;
ϕw;0 ¼
bw;0
awk;0
awv;0
0
B@
1
CA¼
w−f wkk
f wk
f wv
0
BB@
1
CCA;
ϕrk;0 ¼
br;0
ark;0
arv;0
0
B@
1
CA¼
rk−f rkk
f rk
f rv
0
BB@
1
CCA:
We also initialize the R matrix at the initial steady state. Define the variance/covariance matrix of k^ tv^ t
 
as
Covðk; vÞ ¼
s2k skv
skv s2v
 !
;
where s2k ; s
2
v ð ¼ `ð1−ρ2Þ−1s2uÞ are the variances of the steady state capital and technology shock, and skv is the covariance
between capital and the shock vt in the initial steady state. Using standard techniques we can obtain these variances using
Eqs. (16) and (17)33
vecðCovðk; vÞÞ ¼ ðI−B⊗BÞ−1vecðΩkvÞ;
Ωkv ¼
0 0
0 s2u
 !
;
so that s2k ; skv, and s
2
v are given by the first, second, and fourth elements of vecðCovðk; vÞÞ. The second moment matrix of zt
can then be initialized as
R ¼
1 k 0
k k
2 þ s2k skv
0 skv s2v
0
BB@
1
CCA;
which gives the starting point for the algorithm for RLS learning.Appendix C. Details of RE solution with policy change
We obtain the RE solution under a policy change as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, p. 352), to get
Ucðct ;ntÞ ¼ βEt ½Ucðctþ1;ntþ1Þf1þ ðrk;tþ1−δÞg; ð39Þ
Unðct ;ntÞ
Ucðct ;ntÞ
¼−wt ¼ −ð1−αÞvt
kt
nt
 α
; ð40Þ
rk;tþ1 ¼ αvt
ntþ1
ktþ1
 1−α
; ð41Þ
ct ¼ vtkαt n1−αt þ ð1−δÞkt−gt−ktþ1: ð42Þ
We have for the utility function (2)
Ucðct ;ntÞ ¼ c−st ; Unðct ;ntÞ ¼−ζð1−ntÞ−ϵ33 Here vec denotes the operator that stacks the columns of a matrix into a vector.
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–19711968and using these, (40) simplifies to
ζc−st
ð1−ntÞϵ
¼ ð1−αÞvt
kt
nt
 α
:
Using (42) to eliminate consumption we get
ζðvtkαt n1−αt þ ð1−δÞkt−gt−ktþ1Þs−ð1−αÞvt
kt
nt
 α
ð1−ntÞϵ ¼ 0: ð43Þ
Under policy changes, this (and all subsequent) equations will be linearized around the final steady state.34 Linearizing (43)
we get
0¼ Gg0ðgt−gÞ þ Gk0ðkt−kÞ þ Gk1ðktþ1−kÞ þ Gn0ðnt−nÞ þ Gv0ðvt−vÞ: ð44Þ
Gk0 denotes the partial derivatives evaluated for capital at the current time period t (e.g. ktÞ and Gk1 denotes the partial
derivatives evaluated for capital at next period t+1 (e.g. ktþ1Þ, etc. At the steady state these derivatives are
Gk0 ¼ ζscs−1ðrk þ 1−δÞ−ð1−αÞrk
ð1−nÞϵ
n
;
Gk1 ¼−ζscs−1;
Gn0 ¼ ζscs−1w þ ð1−αÞvk
αfαn−α−1ð1−nÞϵ þ ϵn−αð1−nÞϵ−1g;
Gv0 ¼ ζscs−1k
α
n1−α−ð1−αÞkαn−αð1−nÞϵ;
Gg0 ¼−ζscs−1;
Gτn0 ¼wð1−nÞϵ:
Eq. (39) on using (42) becomes
ðvtkαt n1−αt þ ð1−δÞkt−gt−ktþ1Þ−s ¼ βEt fvtþ1kαtþ1n1−αtþ1 þ ð1−δÞktþ1−gtþ1−ktþ2g
−sh
 1þ αvtþ1
ntþ1
ktþ1
 1−α
−δ
 !( )#
:
We can linearize this to obtain a solution of the form
0¼Hk0ðkt−kÞ þ Hk1ðktþ1−kÞ þ Hk2Etðktþ2−kÞ þ Hn0ðnt−nÞ
þHn1Etðntþ1−nÞ þ Hg0ðgt−gÞ þ Hg1Etðgtþ1−gÞ þ Hv0ðvt−vÞ
þHv1Etðvtþ1−vÞ: ð45Þ
Define the H coefficients here
Hk0 ¼−sc−s−1ðrk þ 1−δÞ;
Hk1 ¼ sc−s−1 þ βsc−s−1ðrk þ 1−δÞr þ βð1−αÞc−sðαvn1−αk
α−2Þ;
Hk2 ¼Hg1 ¼−βsc−s−1r ¼ −sc−s−1;
Hn0 ¼−sc−s−1w;
Hn1 ¼ βsc−s−1wr−βc−sðαð1−αÞvn−αk
α−1Þ;
Hg0 ¼ sc−s−1;
Hv0 ¼−sc−s−1k
α
n1−α;
Hv1 ¼ βsc−s−1k
α
n1−αr−βrkc
−s;
Hτk1 ¼ βc−sðrk−δÞ:
From (44) we get
nt−n ¼ −G−1n0 ½Gg0ðgt−gÞ þ Gk0ðkt−kÞ þ Gk1ðktþ1−kÞ þ Gv0ðvt−vÞ; ð46Þ
which implies
Et ½ntþ1−n ¼−G−1n0 ½Gg0Etðgtþ1−gÞ þ Gk0ðktþ1−kÞ þ Gk1Etðktþ2−kÞ þ Gv0Etðvtþ1−vÞ: ð47Þ
ktþ1 is known in period t, so there is no expectation before this term.
Eqs. (46) and (47) are substituted in (45) to eliminate nt and ntþ1 which gives an equation involving only the endogenous
variable capital stock
0¼ Jk0ðkt−kÞ þ Jk1ðktþ1−kÞ þ Jk2Etðktþ2−kÞ þ Jg0ðgt−gÞ þ Jg1Etðgtþ1−gÞ þ Jv0ðvt−vÞ þ Jv1Etðvtþ1−vÞ: ð48Þ34 For convenience we now use g ; k , etc., to denote the final steady state.
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Jk0 ¼Hk0−Hn0G−1n0Gk0;
Jk1 ¼Hk1−Hn0G−1n0Gk1−Hn1G−1n0Gk0;
Jk2 ¼Hk2−Hn1G−1n0Gk1;
Jg0 ¼Hg0−Hn0G−1n0Gg0;
Jg1 ¼Hg1−Hn1G−1n0Gg0;
Jv0 ¼Hv0−Hn0G−1n0Gv0;
Jv1 ¼Hv1−Hn1G−1n0Gv0;
Hτn0 ¼ −Hn0G−1n0Gτn0;
Hτn1 ¼ −Hn1G−1n0Gτn0;
and Hτk1 is defined after (45).
Eq. (48) is a second order difference equation for kt in terms of the exogenous policy variables gt and the shock vt with a
condition for initial capital stock k0. The linear approximation to the solution for the equilibrium kt sequence is obtained by
solving the stable root backward and the unstable root forward (see [Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012, Chapter 11] for the
details). We finally write (48) as
Etðktþ2−kÞ þ Ak1ðktþ1−kÞ þ Ak0ðkt−kÞ ¼ Ag0ðgt−gÞ þ Ag1Etðgtþ1−gÞ þ Av0ðvt−vÞ þ Av1Etðvtþ1−vÞ; ð49Þ
where
Ak1 ¼ Jk1J−1k2 ;Ak0 ¼ Jk0J−1k2 ;
Ag0 ¼−Jg0J−1k2 ;Ag1 ¼ −Jg1J−1k2 ;
Av0 ¼−Jv0J−1k2 ;Av1 ¼−Jv1J−1k2 ;
Aτk1 ¼ −Hτk1J−1k2 ;
Aτn0 ¼−Hτn0J−1k2 ;Aτn0 ¼ −Hτn1J−1k2 :
For this model, one can show that
Ag0 ¼
1
1þ n1d1
; Ag1 ¼−1;
n1 ¼ αζcsk
αð1−nÞ1−ϵ n
k
 1þα
n−α40;
d1 ¼ β−1fð1−nÞαþ nϵg40;
so that 0oAg0o1 and hence Ag1 þ Ag0o0.
The government spending process implies Etgtþ1 ¼ gtþ1. Also given the process for vt
Etðvtþj−vÞ ¼ ρjðvt−vÞ:
Assuming
Etktþ2 ¼ ktþ2 þ ηtþ1; Etηtþ1 ¼ 0;
Eq. (49) becomes
ðktþ2−kÞ þ Ak1ðktþ1−kÞ þ Ak0ðkt−kÞ ¼ Ag0ðgt−gÞ þ Ag1ðgtþ1−gÞ þ Av0ðvt−vÞ þ Av1ρðvt−vÞ−ηtþ1: ð50Þ
The stochastic process (50) can be solved using the techniques in Sargent (1987, p. 393). This yields
ktþ1−k ¼ λ2ðkt−kÞ−λ2A−1k0 ∑
∞
j ¼ 0
λ−j1 Et ½Ag0ðgtþj−gÞ þ Ag1ðgtþjþ1−gÞ þ ðAv0 þ ρAv1Þðvtþj−vÞ−ηtþjþ1
¼ λ2ðkt−kÞ−λ2A−1k0 ∑
∞
j ¼ 0
λ−j1 Et ½Ag0ðgtþj−gÞ þ Ag1ðgtþjþ1−gÞ þ ðAv0 þ ρAv1Þðvtþj−vÞ:
This finally gives the stochastic process for capital (using the hatted values for deviations from RE steady state)
k^tþ1 ¼ λ2k^t−λ2A−1k0 ∑
∞
j ¼ 0
λ−j1 Et ½Ag0ðgtþj−gÞ þ Ag1ðgtþjþ1−gÞ þ ðAv0 þ ρAv1Þv^tþj: ð51Þ
Here λ1; λ2 are given by the roots of the quadratic equation (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012, p. 345)
λ2 þ Ak1λþ Ak0 ¼ 0;
λ1λ2 ¼ Ak0;
where it is assumed that λ141 and 0oλ2o1.
K. Mitra et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 1947–19711970We now specialize the analysis and summarize the details for obtaining a linear approximation to the equilibrium
RE capital sequence under a permanent policy change of the type considered in the paper.35 The capital sequence is given
by (51), i.e.
k^tþ1 ¼ λ2k^t−λ2A−1k0 ðSgðtÞ þ SvðtÞÞ; ð52Þ
where
SgðtÞ≡ ∑
∞
j ¼ 0
λ−j1 EtfAg0ðgtþj−gÞ þ Ag1ðgtþjþ1−gÞg; ð53Þ
SvðtÞ≡ ∑
∞
j ¼ 0
λ−j1 EtðAv0 þ ρAv1Þv^tþj ¼ ðAv0 þ ρAv1Þ ∑
∞
j ¼ 0
λ−j1 ρ
jv^t : ð54Þ
We have
gt−g ¼
g ′−g ; 1≤toTp;
0; t≥Tp;
(
gtþj−g ¼
g ′−g ; t þ joTp;
0; t þ j≥Tp:
(
One can show that Ag1 ¼−1 in (53) which gives us
Ag0ðgtþj−gÞ þ Ag1ðgtþjþ1−gÞ ¼
ðAg0−1Þðg ′−gÞ; t þ j≤Tp−2;
Ag0ðg ′−gÞ; t þ j¼ Tp−1;
0; t þ j≥Tp:
8><
>:
We first compute (54). For all t≥1, we have
SvðtÞ≡ðAv0 þ ρAv1Þv^t ∑
∞
j ¼ 0
λ−j1 ρ
j ¼ ðAv0 þ ρAv1Þv^t
1− ρλ1
: ð55Þ
Then we compute (53). If 1≤t≤Tp−2, we have
SgðtÞ≡ ∑
Tp−2−t
j ¼ 0
λ−j1 ðAg0−1Þðg ′−gÞ þ λ
−ðTp−1−tÞ
1 Ag0ðg ′−gÞ ¼ ðAg0−1Þ
1−λ−ðTp−1−tÞ1
1−λ−11
þ λ−ðTp−1−tÞ1 Ag0
 !
ðg ′−gÞ
and if t ¼ Tp−1, then we have
SgðtÞ≡Ag0ðg ′−gÞ
and SgðtÞ ¼ 0 for t≥Tp.
To summarize
SgðtÞ ¼
ðAg0−1Þ
1−λ−ðTp−1−tÞ1
1−λ−11
þ λ−ðTp−1−tÞ1 Ag0
 !
ðg ′−gÞ; 1≤t≤Tp−1;
0; t≥Tp:
8><
>: ð56Þ
Using the formulas in (55) and (56), we can compute the linearized capital dynamics under RE from (52) for a permanent
change in government spending under a balanced budget. This is the dynamics which we compare with the learning
dynamics.
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